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CAN(NOT) A STATE LAW OVERRIDE A FEDERAL TREATY OBLIGATION?
By
Evangelo M. Theodosopoulos∗
I.

INTRODUCTION
Arbitration contracts between United States’ parties and foreign parties

face uncertainty from state insurance laws containing anti-arbitration provisions.
Though courts have done well to respect parties’ decisions to arbitrate, the same
courts have struggled to respect parties’ decisions to arbitrate insurance disputes.
Until recently, the law was settled that such arbitration agreements relating to
contracts of insurance were ultimately subject to state law above all else.1
The United States’ Congress expressly granted the fifty states’ preeminent
authority to regulate the insurance industry under the McCarran Ferguson Act.2
States have used this authority to enact laws that forbid parties to arbitrate
insurance related disputes.3 Problems arise when one of the parties to the
arbitration agreement, which is now rendered void by state law, is an international
party. International parties are left wondering why the American courts’

∗ Evangelo M. Theodosopoulos is a 2011 J.D. Candidate at the Pennsylvania State
University Dickinson School of Law.
1
Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995).
2
McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (focusing on the preemption provision
in § 1012(a); (b)). The McCarran Ferguson Act was Congress’ response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn.,322 U.S. 533 (1944)
where the Supreme Court held that insurance was interstate commerce and therefore not
subject to regulation by states. Congress felt that insurance regulation was traditionally
within the realm of state’s responsibility and therefore the purpose of the McCarran
Ferguson Act was to turn back the power of insurance regulation to the states as it belonged
before the Supreme Court’s decision in South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n..
3
Survey of state statutes prohibiting arbitration of insurance related disputes: (1) Arkansas,
ACA 16-108-20. (2) Hawaii, HRS 431:10 -221. (3) Kansas, KSA 5-401 (not affecting
arbitration for reinsurance contracts). (4) Kentucky, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. 304.22-101(6). (5)
Louisiana, LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 22:629. (6) Missouri, V.A.M.S. 435.350; 20 Mo. Code
of State Regulations 500-1.600. (7) Nebraska, Neb. Rev. St. 25-2602.01. (8) Oklahoma,
12 Okl. St. § 1855(D). (9) South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. 15-48-10(b)(4). (10) South
Dakota, SDCL 21-25A-3. (11) Washington, RCWA 48.18.200. (12) Virginia, Va. Code.
Ann. 38.2-312.
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responsibility to compel arbitration under the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards4 (hereinafter “New York
Convention”) fall victim to contrary state laws. To complicate matters, foreign
insurers play a significant role in the American insurance industry, and arbitration
is a preferred method of dispute resolution for international parties.5
In Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London6, (hereinafter “Safety National”) the Fifth Circuit determined that the
McCarran Ferguson Act did not allow state law to invalidate an arbitration
agreement falling under the New York Convention.7 The outcome was both a
victory and a loss. Under the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, foreign insurers doing
business with American parties can rest assured that American courts will compel
arbitration when faced with a valid arbitration agreement, despite the McCarran
Ferguson Act and state laws to the contrary.8 The problem is that the Fifth Circuit
was not the first United States’ Circuit court to speak to this issue as the Second
Circuit had already decided the opposite.9
The Supreme Court denied cert to resolve the split between the Second and
Fifth Circuit, after inviting the Solicitor General of the United States to file a brief

4

United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards Art. 2, September 30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
5
Arthur D. Postal, Foreign, Domestic Insurers Square Off in Offshore Tax Testimony,
National Underwriters Online, July 17, 2010, available at http://www.propertycasualty.com/News/2010/7/Pages/Foreign-Domestic-Insurers-Square-.aspx; John P. Dearie
& Michael Griffin, Overseas Insurers, Risk Management Magazine, Vol 56. Feb. 1, 2009,
available
at
http://www.rmmag.com/MGTemplate.cfm?Section=MagArchive&NavMenuID=304&tem
plate=/Magazine/DisplayMagazines.cfm&Archive=1&IssueID=332&AID=3835&Volume
=56&ShowArticle=1.
6
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th
Cir. 2009).
7
Id. at 732.
8
Id.
9
Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995).
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expressing the views of the United States.10 The Fifth Circuit and Second Circuit
opinions cannot be reconciled easily. There is little ground for consensus between
the two opinions. Until the Supreme Court speaks on this issue, practitioners must
be aware that the Fifth Circuit will uphold international arbitration agreements
despite state insurance regulations to the contrary, so long as the New York
Convention would validate the arbitration agreement.
II.

CASE LAW

A.

Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London11 (En Banc)
The Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen, Self Insurer’s Fund

(hereinafter “LSAT”) is a self insurance fund in Louisiana providing workers’
compensation insurance for its members.12 LSAT purchased excess insurance
coverage from Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (hereinafter “Lloyd’s”)
for claims sounding in occupational-injury occurrences that exceeded amounts in
LSAT accounts.13 Each reinsurance agreement LSAT purchased from Lloyd’s
contained an arbitration contract.14 After LSAT purchased reinsurance coverage
from Lloyd’s, LSAT negotiated a Loss Portfolio Transfer agreement with Safety
National Casualty Corporation (hereinafter “respondent”) whereby LSAT assigned
its rights under the agreements with Lloyd’s to respondent.15 Lloyd’s refused to
honor LSAT’s agreement with respondent.16

10

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2010 LEXIS 6262 (Cert. denied); see also, Safety Nat’l
Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 130 S. Ct. 3311 (inviting Solicitor
General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States).
11
587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009).
12
Id. at 717.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d 714.
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Respondent brought suit in federal district court against Lloyd’s to recover
rights from the reinsurance agreements gained from the Loss Portfolio Transfer
Agreement negotiated between respondent and LSAT.17 Lloyd’s moved to compel
arbitration, and LSAT contended that the arbitration agreements were
unenforceable under Louisiana Law.18 The district court quashed Lloyd’s motion
to compel arbitration, noting that the New York Convention19 normally requires
the court to compel arbitration but in this case a Louisiana Statute20 that prohibits
arbitration agreements in insurance contracts required the Court to disregard the
New York Convention.21 The district court reasoned that the New York
Convention was reverse-preempted by State law because of the McCarran
Ferguson Act.22 The Louisiana district court subsequently certified the order
containing its rulings for immediate appeal because its ruling involved a question
of law to which there was substantial ground for difference of opinion pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).23 A panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that the McCarran
Ferguson Act did not allow the Louisiana anti-arbitration provision to ‘reverse
preempt’ the New York Convention or the New York Convention’s Implementing
legislation.24 The Fifth Circuit granted Rehearing en banc, and the panel opinion
was vacated.25 In its En Banc opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that the state law does
not reverse-preempt the New York Convention.26
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by looking to the texts of the relevant
statutes and treaties: The Louisiana statute,27 the New York Convention, Section 2

17

Id.
Id. at 718.
19
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
20
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868.
21
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 718.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 718 (discussing the holding of the lower court in the context of the treaty itself, and
the treaty’s implementing legislation.).
25
Id.
26
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 718.
27
Id. at 718 (referring to LA. Rev. Stat. Ann § 22:868).
18
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of the Federal Arbitration Act (the New York Convention’s implementing
legislation),28 and the McCarran Ferguson Act.29 The relevant portion of the
Louisiana statute30 that LSAT cited to deny Lloyd’s motion to compel arbitration
provides:
A. No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in
this state and covering subjects located, resident or to be
performed in this state… shall contain any condition,
stipulation, or agreement:…
(2) Depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of
action against the insurer.
(C) Any such condition, stipulation, or agreement in
violation of this Section shall be void, but such voiding shall
not affect the validity of the other provisions of the contract.
The Court noted that Louisiana courts voided arbitration agreements on the basis
of this statute, although it is not clear from the text of the statute that arbitration
agreements were unenforceable.31 Next, the court concluded that the Louisiana
Statute conflicted with the United States commitments under the New York
Convention.32 The relevant portion of the New York Convention provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or may
28

Id. at 718 (referring to the New York Convention’s implementing legislation, Chapter 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act).
29
Id. at 718 (referring to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (focusing on the preemption provision in
§ 1012(a);(b))).
30
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868.
31
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 719.
32
Id.
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arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, concerning subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration…
3. The Court of a Contract State, when seized of an action in
a matter in respect of which the parties have made an
agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration,
unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.33
In looking to the text of the New York Convention, the court determined that the
treaty contemplates enforcement of agreements under the convention in the
signatory nation’s courts.34 The court next looked to the text the treaty’s
implementing legislation and noted that the implementing legislation establishes
both federal court jurisdiction and venue.35
The Court also considered the text of the McCarran Ferguson Act. The
relevant portion of the statute provides that “No act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance... unless such act specifically relates to the
business of insurance.” Neither party argued that the New York Convention and its
implementing legislation specifically related to the business of insurance.36 It was
assumed that the Louisiana statute regulates the business of insurance because
neither party made it an issue.37 The focus of the Court’s discussion was centered
on whether the Louisiana statute overrode the New York Convention’s

33

New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards:
Art. II pp. 1, 3.
34
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 719.
35
Id. (citing the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 203-4.).
36
Id. at 720-721.
37
Id. at 721.

572

YEARBOOK ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION

requirement that the parties’ dispute be submitted to arbitration because the Court
construes an act of Congress to invalidate, impair, or supersede state law.38
LSAT argued that the New York Convention was not a self executing
treaty and that the New York Convention only had effect in United States courts
because the United States Congress passed implementing legislation.39 According
to LSAT, the Court must look to the implementing legislation and the McCarran
Ferguson Act requires the Court to construe the New York Convention’s
implementing legislation as reverse preempted by Louisiana’s Anti-arbitration
statute.40 In considering LSAT’s argument The Court first discussed the
importance of whether the New York Convention was self-executing or not in
more detail.
LSAT conceded to the Court that, if the New York Convention were selfexecuting “it would be a treaty and not an ‘Act of Congress’ within the meaning of
the McCarran Ferguson Act.”41 Nevertheless, Lloyd’s did not argue that the New
York Convention was self executing.42 The Court proceeded to discuss, however,
the test for determining whether a treaty is self executing, referencing the Supreme
Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas.43 Applying the Court’s reasoning in
Medillin, paying close attention to the Court’s dicta,44 the Fifth Circuit only said
that the Supreme Court’s language and decision in Medillin did not foreclose the
possibility that the New York Convention is partially self-executing.45 The Fifth
Circuit, however, did not make such a decision, reasoning instead that “Act of

38

Id.
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 721.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that the Avena judgments of the International Court of
Justice were not binding on United States courts because the Vienna Convention was not
self executing).
44
See id. at 521-522 (citing the New York Convention as an example of Congress
according domestic effect to international obligations when it desires that result).
45
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 723.
39
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congress,” as used in the McCarran Ferguson Act, was not meant to encompass a
non-self executing treaty that has been implemented by Congressional
legislation.46
The bottom line for the 5th Circuit is that a treaty remains a treaty, not an
“Act of Congress,” even if the treaty is implemented by Congressional
legislation.47 Although the concept is easy to understand, the majority opinion is
filled with justifications for such a conclusion. Somewhat self-explanatory, the
majority explains that a treaty remains a treaty and not an “Act of Congress”
because the treaty is negotiated by the Executive branch and ratified by the senate,
not Congress.48 The Court thought it untenable that when Congress used the phrase
“Act of Congress” in the McCarran Ferguson Act, that the Congress intended that
phrase to exclude self-executing treaties while including treaties implemented by
Congress.49 Language in the Federal Arbitration Act implementing the New York
Convention also supports the majority’s distinction that an action within the New
York Convention arises under the “Laws of the United States” as well as the
“Treaties of the United States.”50 The Fifth Circuit read Congress’ construction of
Section 203 to mean that Congress thought that jurisdiction to enforce rights under
the New York Convention did not “arise solely under an Act of Congress.”51
Focusing on the language in the implementing legislation, the Court said
that it must “construe”52 the convention to be faced with the possibility of
“superseding,” invalidating, or impairing the Louisiana law because the
implementing legislation says little more than that it is implementing the treaty.53
The Court next lists rules articulated in the New York Convention that supersede,
46

Id.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 723-724.
50
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 724 (looking to Jurisdiction; Amount in
Controversy, 9 U.S.C. § 203 “[a]n action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall
be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States”).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 725 (using “construe” as the term is used in the McCarran Ferguson Act).
53
Id.
47
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invalidate, or impair the function of the Louisiana law.54 The Fifth Circuit
explained that only by reference to the rules articulated in the convention, an
implemented treaty, is there a command – “a judicially enforceable remedy” – to
compel arbitration and impair the function of the Louisiana anti-arbitration
statute.55
The Fifth Circuit majority proceeded to attack the dissent’s position that an
implemented non-self executing treaty is not a treaty within the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause56 of the U.S. Constitution.57 The majority explains that the
dissent’s reliance on Hopson v. Kreps58 for the proposition that an implemented
treaty has no independent significance is misplaced because the dissent reads
Hopson out of context.59 According to the majority, the dissent short circuits the
meaning of Hopson because Hopson stands for the proposition that an
implemented treaty does not have independent significance in defining the terms of
its implementing legislation when the treaty and implementing legislation are in
conflict, not that an implemented treaty has no significance as the dissent suggests.
The majority also criticizes the dissent’s reliance on a “consensus of legal
scholars,” explaining that the only source cited by the dissent would support the
majority’s position.60
After attacking the dissent’s position, the majority looks to case law at the
time that the McCarran Ferguson Act was enacted to see whether courts analyzed

54

Id.
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 725.
56
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
57
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 725.
58
622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that an implemented treaty may aid in
defining the intended meaning of the terms used in the implementing statute, but the treaty
does not have independent significance in defining terms used in the implementing statute
when the treaty and the implementing statute are in conflict).
59
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 726.
60
Id. (quoting a passage from Louis Henkin, REPORTER OF RESTATEMENT (3RD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW).
55
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treaties as “Acts of Congress.”61 The majority proffers Missouri v. Holland62 to
support its position that an implemented treaty is viewed as distinct from the “act
of congress” that implements the treaty.63 From this 1920 Supreme Court case, the
majority explains, Congress, in passing the McCarran Ferguson Act two decades
later, was aware that a treaty that requires implementing legislation is distinct from
an Act of Congress and the treaty itself could validly “‘override [a state’s]
power.’”64 It is furthermore unlikely that when Congress crafted the McCarran
Ferguson Act that Congress intended to abrogate any future treaty implemented by
an Act of Congress.65 The Majority thinks it is more likely that, should Congress
have intended for non-self-executing treaties to fall within the purview of the
McCarran Ferguson Act, that Congress would have included the phrase “or any
treaty requiring congressional implementation” following the phrase “Act of
Congress.”66
The Majority also found support for its position to compel arbitration in
the “congressionally sanctioned national policy favoring arbitration of international
commercial agreements.”67 The majority focused on the Supreme Court’s
discussion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,68 to
elaborate the policy aspects supporting the decision to compel arbitration. The
majority emphasized that International arbitration has become commonplace in an
economy of expanding international trade, judicial hostility to arbitration must
lessen, and national courts must cede jurisdiction of claims to transnational
tribunals to support an international policy favoring commercial arbitration.69 The
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi subjected national antitrust laws to arbitration

61

Id. at 728.
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
63
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 728.
64
Id. at 729 (quoting Holland, 252 U.S. at 434).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 730.
68
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
69
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 730 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638-39).
62
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explaining that all claims implicating statutory rights are subject to arbitration as
per the national policy favoring arbitration articulated in the Federal Arbitration
Act, less the “congressional intention expressed in some other statute” identifies a
series of claims which must be held unenforceable.70 Further, the Court stated that
the Sherman Act did not evince such intent in Mitsubishi71, and the Majority in
Safety National did not discern the McCarran Ferguson Act to “include protection
against waiver of the right to a judicial forum.”72 The majority explains that the
“strong policy” interests of states in regulating of the business of insurance are
“ameliorated by the substantive provisions in the Convention,” because “the
national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the awardenforcement stage” to ensure that the legitimate interests of states in regulating
insurance is protected.73
B.

Circuit Split: Fifth Circuit versus the Second Circuit
The majority in Safety National74 concludes by expressing awareness that

its decision conflicts with precedent in the Second Circuit.75 In dissecting the
relevant portion of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Stephens v. American
International Insurance co.76 the majority explains that the Second Circuit merely
concluded that the New York Convention did not contain self executing treaty
provisions, but notes that the Second Circuit did not address the intent of Congress

70

Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627.
72
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 730.
73
Id. at 730-731.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 731.
76
Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995) (holding that a Kentucky antiarbitration provision regulating the business of insurance reverse preempted the New York
Convention because the New York Convention is a non-self-executing treaty that gets its
domestic effect from its implementing legislation, and implementing legislation is an Act
of Congress).
71

SENIOR EDITOR COMMENTS ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION

577

in using the phrase “no Act of Congress” in the McCarran Ferguson Act.77 The
Fifth Circuit therefore attempts to make self-execution irrelevant to its reasoning,
in explaining that treaty provisions, self-executing or not, cannot be reverse
preempted by state law under the McCarran Ferguson Act because no treaty is
within the reach of the McCarran Ferguson Act.78 Essentially, the Fifth Circuit
sidesteps the Second Circuit’s finding that the implementing legislation gave the
New York Convention its legal effect. The Fifth Circuit also notes that a
subsequent decision, Stephens v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.,79 casts
doubt on the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Stephens v. American International
Insurance Co.80 despite the Second Circuit’s carefully navigating its decision
through alternative reasoning in its subsequent decision.81
Judge Edith Brown Clement of the Fifth Circuit was the lone concurrence
for Safety National, but nevertheless she expands a compelling argument first
suggested by the majority, and not addressed by the dissent. The Majority does not
address whether Article II Section 3 of the New York Convention is a selfexecuting treaty provision because the majority claims that Lloyd’s did not brief
the argument for its en banc rehearing.82 Judge Brown Clement explains that
Lloyd’s should not be punished for focusing their en banc brief to address the

77

Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 731 (distinguishing Stephens, 66 F.3d 41).
Id.
79
69 F.3d 1226 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a New York insurance law did not reverse
preempt the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because the McCarran Ferguson Act does
not allow state law to reverse preempt the common law, and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act operated by common law before Congress codified the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act with an Act of Congress).
80
66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995).
81
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 732 (quoting the Second Circuit in n.6 of Stephens
v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 69 F.3d at 1233, where the Court explained that
another panel ruled that the McCarran Ferguson Act prohibited the application of the
Federal Arbitration Act in a way that preempted Kentucky insurance law, but this panel did
not have to consider whether its holding conflicted with the other panel because this panel
may rest its opinion on the ground that the Federal Statute at issue passed before the
McCarran Ferguson Act and was well supported in Common Law before it was codified in
statute).
82
Id. at 732 n.1 (Clement, J., concurring).
78
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question posed by the panel.83 According to Judge Brown Clement Article II,
Section 3, of the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty provision.84 The
idea of a self-executing treaty provision comes from the Supreme Court’s language
in Medellin.85 A treaty’s parts may be separated from the whole of the treaty in
order to evaluate whether a part of the treaty is self-executing.86 Applying
Medellin, Judge Brown Clement analyzes the language in Article II and concludes
that Article II of the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty provision
because it provides a “directive to domestic courts” when it uses mandatory
language requiring courts to refer parties to arbitration.87 The Concurrence
appropriately deals with unfavorable dicta in Medellin88 where the Supreme Court
suggests that the Congress knows how to give domestic effect to a treaty when it
has to do so, using the implementing legislation of the New York Convention as an
example.89 Starting from the idea that a treaty provision, not the whole treaty, is the
appropriate unit of analysis in determining self-executing status, Judge Brown
Clement limits the effective application of the Supreme Court’s dicta in Medellin.
Judge Brown Clement explains that the Supreme Court was not referring to Article
II, Section 3, in its example of a non-self-executing treaty provision and therefore
Medellin’s dicta did not imply that the Convention is “non-self-executing in all
respects.”90 Recognizing that multilateral treaties are “presumptively non-self-

83

Id.
Id. at 732-733.
85
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (noting its “obligation to interpret treaty provisions
to determine whether they are self-executing”).
86
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 734 (Clement, J., concurring) (“Although the
Supreme Court has never expressly held that individual treaty provisions may be selfexecuting, while a treaty in its entirety may not be, its case law inescapably leads to this
conclusion”).
87
Id. at 735 (Clement, J., concurring) (quoting language from Medillin).
88
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
89
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 521-522.
90
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 736 (Clement, J., concurring).
84
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executing,” Judge Brown Clement nevertheless concludes that Article II Section 3
of the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty provision.91
Three judges dissented from the majority opinion of the en banc panel in
Safety National. The dissent begins by stating its argument in plain terms,
implementing legislation is an “Act of Congress” and because the implementing
legislation of the New York Convention does not explicitly address insurance, it is
not capable of preempting state law.92 The dissent contends that there is no
precedent to suggest that a non-self-executing treaty, in and of itself, has the power
to preempt state law.93 The source of preemptive authority for a non-self-executing
treaty is its implementing legislation.94 The dissent points to a string of authority
for the proposition that non-self-executing treaties can only be enforced pursuant
to legislation to carry them into effect.95 The dissent explains that these treaties,
requiring implementing legislation, have equal standing with federal statutes.96
After responding to every argument forwarded by the majority, the dissent
concludes that the holding of the Second Circuit should control the outcome of this
case.97
III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Navigating the Circuit Split
The majority in Safety National (en banc) composes a lengthy opinion

with many arguments forwarded to support its conclusion, but a small three-judge
91

Id. at 737. (Clement, J., concurring).
Id. (Elrod, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 738. (Elrod, J., dissenting).
94
Id. (Elrod, J., dissenting).
95
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 738 (Elrod, dissenting) (citing Foster v. Neilson¸ 7
L. Ed. 415 (1829), Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), and Medellin, 552 U.S. 491
(2008)).
96
Id. at 737 (Elrod, J., dissenting) (citing Edye v. Robertson (Head-Money Cases), 112
U.S. 580 (1884)).
97
Id. at 751 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
92
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dissent drafts an opinion equal to the majority in its persuasive appeal. The Second
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have now addressed the same issue and provided
diametrically opposed opinions. The Fifth Circuit majority attempts to distinguish
the Second Circuit’s opinion,98 but the effectiveness of such an attempt will be
judged by the lower courts in navigating through the case law.
The majority ultimately forwards three main arguments in support of its
conclusion (1) A treaty and the act of Congress that implements the treaty cannot
be merely an “Act of Congress”99 (2) Implemented, non-self-executing treaties are
not “Acts of Congress” as that phrase is used in the McCarran Ferguson Act,100 and
(3) America’s strong national policy favoring the decision to compel arbitration in
international commercial agreements bolster’s the majority’s conclusion.101 The
dissent argues that (1) only the Implementing legislation of a non-self-executing
treaty is capable of preempting state law,102 (2) a non-self-executing treaty has no
independent significance apart from its implementing legislation,103 and (3) a nonself-executing treaty’s implementing legislation is on par with a federal statute
subject to reverse preemption under the McCarran Ferguson Act.104
Borrowing the novel approach forwarded by the Safety National
concurrence may be the safest way to reconcile the Fifth Circuit with the Second
Circuit. The Second Circuit’s reasoning can be distinguished on the basis that the
Supreme Court articulated a new framework for determining self-executing treaty
status in Medellin,105 thirteen years after Stephens106 was decided. Stephens holding

98

See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 740 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
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relies on the finding that the New York Convention is a non-self-executing treaty.
Also, the Second Circuit’s analysis in Stephens is less than thorough on this
point.107 Applying the newer, binding framework for determining self-executing
treaty status articulated in Medellin, and then reaching the conclusion that Article
II, Section 3, of the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty provision is a
sufficient ground for distinguishing the result in Stephens without sidestepping the
result in Stephens.
B.

The Aftermath: Pick a Side
Since Safety National (en banc) was decided by the Fifth Circuit, the other

federal circuits and state courts alike have abstained from the debate over whether
the McCarran-Ferguson Act authorizes states’ laws to preempt international
arbitration agreements falling under the New York Convention. The Fifth Circuit
since clarified its position on the McCarran-Ferguson Act in the context of
arbitration, explaining “We have held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows state
regulation of insurance to preempt the FAA (Internal citations omitted). However,
even more recently we have held that state insurance law cannot reverse preempt
the New York Convention and its implementing legislation (Internal citation
omitted).”108
Academics have sided with the Fifth Circuit. The Restatement (Third) of
International Commercial Arbitration takes the position that the McCarran
Ferguson Act does not restrict arbitral tribunals of their jurisdiction over

interpretation’ the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as the
‘postratification understanding’ of signatory nations”).
106
Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995).
107
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 737 (Clement, concurring) (identifying a lack of
analysis in Stephens, 66 F.3d 41 on the point that the New York Convention is not selfexecuting.).
108
Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Berm.) Ltd., 601 F.3d 329, 335 fn.9 (5th Cir.
2010).
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international transactions arising under Chapter Two of the FAA.109 Similarly,
Couch on Insurance takes the position that Congress, in drafting the McCarran
Ferguson Act, did not intend to include “treaty” within the scope of the words “act
of congress,” such that an international agreement among nations would be subject
to reverse preemption.110 Thus far, the Fifth Circuit got it right.
Circuit Judge Cohen’s Concurring opinion in Safety National111 has
influenced at least one other Judge’s approach to analyzing multilateral treaties
status’ as self-executing or not.112 Judge Torreula forcefully argues against the
judicial presumption that multilateral treaties are non-self-executing without first
looking to the text of the treaty.113 Circuit Judge Torruela forcefully argues that
should judges not begin with the text of a treaty when considering the doctrine of
self-execution as instructed by the Supreme Court, the “judicially created theory”
of self-execution will continue to erode our nation’s international commitments.114
IV.

CONCLUSION
The circuit split between the Fifth and Second Circuits may stir

uncertainty for international parties looking to do business in the American
insurance industry. Though the Second Circuit’s opinion left the integrity of
109

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §5-13 (Reporter’s
Notes).
110
111

COUCH ON INSURANCE (THIRD) §2:4.

Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 737 (Clement, J., concurring).
Iguarta v. U.S., 626 F.3d 592, 621 (1st Cir. 2010) (Torruela, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
113
Id. at 621-22 (citing Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d d at 737 (Clement, J.,
concurring)).
114
See id. (Torruela, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The doctrine of selfexecution of treaties, or stated in the negative, of non-self-execution, is a judicially-created
theory which has, at convenient times, been used to avoid international commitments,
particularly where human rights are concerned. Today, this theory promotes a rule whereby
treaties are presumed to be non-self-executing, when in fact the text and history of the
Supremacy Clause counsel exactly the opposite”).
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international commercial arbitration agreements subject to the application of fifty
varying bodies of insurance regulation, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari
leaves parties searching for ways to square the opinions of the Fifth and Second
Circuits. The Fifth Circuit majority suggests grounds to distinguish the Second
Circuit’s conclusion, even when the Second Circuit looked at the same components
(New York Convention, state insurance regulation, and the McCarran Ferguson
Act) to reach its conclusion. Furthermore the dissent in Safety National makes
strong arguments casting doubt on the majority’s analysis of self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties. The effect of Safety National is that all treaties, selfexecuting or not, are no longer within the reach of the McCarran Ferguson Act.
Practitioners representing international parties should be aware of the way that
state jurisdictions have interpreted anti-arbitration provisions when drafting their
arbitration agreements. The safest way to ensure that an arbitration agreement is
enforced is to survey the laws of the controlling state and check for anti-arbitration
provisions or jurisdiction stripping language in the context of insurance.115 While
the Fifth Circuit opinion was a victory for predictability in the field of international
commercial arbitration, comparatively, the Supreme Court’s silence on the split
between the Second and the Fifth Circuit may further complicate matters for
international parties in the insurance industry. Practitioners, be weary!
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